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THE IMPACT OF STARTUP COSTS AND THE GRID OPERATOR ON THE
POWER PRICE EQUILIBRIUM∗
MIHA TROHA† AND RAPHAEL HAUSER‡
Abstract. In this paper we propose a quadratic programming model that can be used for calculating the term
structure of electricity prices while explicitly modeling startup costs of power plants. In contrast to other approaches
presented in the literature, we incorporate the startup costs in a mathematically rigorous manner without relying on
ad hoc heuristics. Moreover, we propose a tractable approach for estimating the startup costs of power plants based on
their historical production. Through numerical simulations applied to the entire UK power grid, we demonstrate that
the inclusion of startup costs is necessary for the modeling of electricity prices in realistic power systems. Numerical
results show that startup costs make electricity prices very spiky. In the second part of the paper, we extend the initial
model by including the grid operator who is responsible for managing the grid. Numerical simulations demonstrate that
robust decision making of the grid operator can significantly decrease the number and severity of spikes in the electricity
price and improve the reliability of the power grid.
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1. Introduction. More than two decades ago, electricity markets started the transition from a
regulated market with a single utility company to a fully competitive market. This introduced a need
for a development of financial models that would help us to understand the behavior of electricity
prices and manage the risk. High uncertainty in the electricity demand and fuel prices requires robust
models, so that low electricity prices and a reliable delivery of electricity can be achieved.
Electricity markets are changing extremely quickly, often faster than any other financial markets.
High pressure on decarbonization has led to new market design and policies. New, intermittent,
renewable sources are connected to the electricity grid almost on a daily basis. Smart grids, together
with the battery storage and demand response, are making their way into market. All these inventions
have an impact on the electricity price and its behavior. The pace of new inventions makes the risk
management and decision making in electricity markets very challenging.
In the literature, there exist three approaches to the modeling of electricity prices. Traditionally,
electricity prices have been modeled by so called non-structural approaches. These approaches attempt
to model electricity prices directly without explicitly considering the fundamental factors that drive
such behavior. [17] investigated the statistical properties of the electricity prices at the Nordic Power
Exchange. The suitability of one and multi-factor Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes for modeling the
spot as well as the log spot price was examined. As pointed out in this work, none of these models
are able to capture the spikes in the electricity price. Thus, various other models that combine the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with a pure jump-process (see [14] for example) or more general Levy
process (see [19] and [11] for example) were proposed. A one-factor model in [7] and multi-factor term-
structure model in [6] are the first that produce prices that are consistent with observable forward
prices. While non-structural models are widely used for the short-term risk management as well as
electricity derivatives pricing purposes in practice, they do not cater well for longer-term modeling
purposes, where the impact of new inventions must be included. They must be frequently recalibrated
to reflect the changes in the markets.
Structural approaches for modeling electricity prices capture some of the fundamental factors of
the electricity market. The supply and demand stack was first used to model electricity prices in [1].
This idea was extended by [16] and by [5], where an exponential supply and demand stack was modeled
as a function of the underlying fuels such as natural gas and coal.
The third, game theoretic, approach models the electricity market even more closely. The dis-
astrous events that happened in California in 2001 confirmed that some physical properties of power
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plants such as ramp-up and ramp-down constants, and market design together with the transmission
lines play a vital role in the behavior of electricity prices. The first game theoretic model for modeling
the electricity prices was proposed in [2], where a unique relation between a forward and a spot price
is given in a two-stage market with one producer and one consumer, who each want to maximize their
mean-variance objective function. This model was extended to a multistage setting in [4] and [3], and
to any convex risk measure in [8]. [21] further extended the work of [3] to a setting with more than one
producer and consumer, who optimize their mean-variance objective functions. In contrast to other
game theoretic models, capacity and ramp-up and ramp-down constraints of power plants are included.
By modeling the profit of power plants as a difference between the power price and fuel costs together
with emissions obligations, this work also incorporates ideas from the structural approach. As in [6]
and [7], the model is consistent with observable fuel and emission prices. [20] applied this model to
calculate the electricity prices in the UK by taking into account the entire power grid consisting of a few
hundred power plants. Numerical simulations show that this model has a tendency to underestimate
spot prices during the peak hours and to overestimate them during the off-peak hours. It is argued
that this may occur because startup costs are not included in the model.
In this paper, we extend the model presented in [20] and include the startup costs. Various
methodologies have already been proposed on how to include the startup costs (see [18], [12] and [23]
for example). Most of them rely on a price uplift approach, where first the power price without startup
costs is calculated. This price is then uplifted to reflect the startup costs. In our model, the startup
costs are included in a mathematically rigorous fashion without relying on the uplift heuristic.
We show that startup costs are responsible for introducing many spikes in spot electricity prices.
To reduce the number of spikes, we include the grid operator, who is responsible for managing the grid
and for a reliable delivery of electricity, by enhancing our model in the second part of the paper.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give a detailed mathematical description of the
model, and in Section 3 we present the numerical results. Numerical results motivate us to introduce
the grid operator in Section 4. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. Problem description. In this section we provide a detailed description of a model that we
use for the purpose of modeling the term structure of electricity prices. The model belongs to a class
of game theoretic equilibrium models. Market participants are divided into consumers and producers.
A set of consumers is denoted by C and has cardinality 0 < |C| <∞. Similarly, a set of producers is
denoted by P and has cardinality 0 < |P | <∞. Each producer owns a portfolio of power plants that
can have different characteristics such as capacity, startup costs, ramp-up and ramp-down constraints,
efficiency, and fuel type. The set of all fuel types is denoted by L. Sets Rp,l denote all power plants
owned by producer p ∈ P that run on fuel l ∈ L. A set Rp,l may be empty since each producer
typically does not own all possible types of power plants. Moreover, this allows us to include non
physical traders such as banks or speculators, who do not own any electricity generation facilities and
are without a physical demand for electricity, as producers p ∈ P with Rp,l = {} for all l ∈ L.
As we will see in Section 2.4, it is useful to introduce another player named the hypothetical
market agent besides producers and consumers. The hypothetical market agent plays the role of the
electricity market and ensures that the term structure of the electricity price is such that the market
clearing condition is satisfied for all electricity forward contracts.
We are interested in delivery times Tj, j ∈ J = {1, ..., T
′}, where power for each delivery time Tj
can be traded through numerous forward contracts at times ti, i ∈ Ij . The electricity price at time ti for
delivery at time Tj is denoted by Π(ti, Tj). Since contracts with trading time later than delivery time do
not exist, we require tmax{Ij} = Tj for all j ∈ J . The number of all forward contracts, i.e.
∑
j∈J |Ij |, is
denoted by N . Uncertainty is modeled by a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F = {Ft, t ∈ I} ,P), where
I = ∪j∈J Ij . The σ-algebra Ft represents information available at time t.
The exogenous variables that appear in our model are (a) aggregate power demand D (Tj) for
each delivery period j ∈ J , (b) prices of fuel forward contracts Gl (ti, Tj) for each fuel l ∈ L, delivery
period j ∈ J , and trading period i ∈ Ij , and (c) prices of emissions forward contracts Gem (ti, Tj),
j ∈ J , i ∈ Ij . Electricity prices and all exogenous variables are assumed to be adapted to the filtration
{Ft}t∈I and have finite second moments.
Let vk ∈ R
nk , nk ∈ N, k ∈ K, and K = {1, ..., |K|} be given vectors. For convenience, we define a
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vector concatenation operator as
||k∈K vk =
[
v⊤1 , ..., v
⊤
|K|
]⊤
.
2.1. Producers. Each producer p ∈ P participates in the electricity, fuel, and emission markets.
Forward as well as spot contracts are available on all markets. Electricity prices, fuel prices, and
emission prices are denoted by Π(ti, Tj), Gl (ti, Tj) where l ∈ L, and Gem (ti, Tj), respectively.
A producer may participate in the market by buying and selling forward and spot contracts.
The number of electricity forward contracts that producer p ∈ P buys at trading time ti, i ∈ Ij for
delivery at time Tj, j ∈ J is denoted by Vp (ti, Tj). Similarly, the number of fuel and emission forward
contracts that producer p ∈ P buys at trading time ti, i ∈ Ij for delivery at time Tj , j ∈ J is denoted
by Fp,l (ti, Tj), l ∈ L and Op (ti, Tj), respectively. Producers own a generally non-empty portfolio of
power plants. The actual production of electricity from power plant r ∈ Rp,l at delivery time Tj, j ∈ J
is denoted by Ŵp,l,r (Tj).
2.1.1. Production variables. In this section we investigate the production of power plants more
closely. Each power plant r ∈ Rp,l, p ∈ P , l ∈ L has a maximum export limit and minimum stable limit
denoted by W
p,l,r
max (Tj) and W
p,l,r
min (Tj), respectively. The maximum export limit defines the maximum
production capacity of a power plant and the minimum stable limit defines the minimum production
that a power plant is able to maintain for a longer period of time. We allow each of the parameters to
be time dependent to account for the maintenance of power plants.
Stable production of each power plant must satisfy
(2.1) Ŵp,l,r (Tj) ∈ {0} ∪
[
W
p,l,r
min (Tj) ,W
p,l,r
max (Tj)
]
for each j ∈ J . It is allowed for a power plant to have production Ŵp,l,r (Tj) ∈
(
0,W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
)
for a
very short period of time (i.e. during a ramp-up and ramp-down phase). To formulate these constraints
in an optimization framework, we introduce new decision variables W
(k)
p,l,r (Tj), k ∈ {1, ..., 6} with the
following meaning:
• W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj), j ∈ J is a continuous variable that is 1 if the power plant is fully ramped up at
time Tj and 0 if the power plant is not producing at all at time Tj . If W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ (0, 1)
then the power plant is in the ramp-up or ramp-down phase. In an optimization framework,
W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj) is defined as
(2.2) W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ [0, 1] .
• W
(2)
p,l,r (Tj), j ∈ J is a binary variable that is 1 if the power plant is fully ramped up at time
Tj and 0 otherwise. In an optimization framework, W
(2)
p,l,r (Tj) is defined as
(2.3)
W
(2)
p,l,r (Tj) ≤W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj)
W
(2)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ [0, 1]
and
(2.4) W
(2)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ Z.
• W
(3)
p,l,r (Tj), j ∈ J\ {1} is a continuous variable that denotes the increase of W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj) from
time Tj−1 to time Tj . In an optimization framework, W
(3)
p,l,r (Tj) is defined as
(2.5) W
(3)
p,l,r (Tj) ≥W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj)−W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj−1)
and
(2.6) W
(3)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ [0, 1] .
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• W
(4)
p,l,r (Tj), j ∈ J\ {1} is a binary variable that is 1 if the power plant is in the ramp-up phase
and 0 otherwise. In an optimization framework, W
(4)
p,l,r (Tj) is defined as
(2.7)
W
(4)
p,l,r (Tj) ≥W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj)−W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj−1)
W
(4)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ [0, 1]
and
(2.8) W
(4)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ Z.
• W
(5)
p,l,r (Tj), j ∈ J\ {1} is a binary variable that is 1 if the power plant is in the ramp-down
phase and 0 otherwise. In an optimization framework, W
(5)
p,l,r (Tj) is defined as
(2.9)
W
(5)
p,l,r (Tj) ≥W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj−1)−W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj)
W
(5)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ [0, 1]
and
(2.10) W
(5)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ Z.
• W
(6)
p,l,r (Tj), j ∈ J is a continuous variable such that
(2.11) Ŵp,l,r (Tj) =W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj)W
p,l,r
min (Tj) +W
(6)
p,l,r (Tj)
(
W
p,l,r
max (Tj)−W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
)
where
(2.12) W
(6)
p,l,r (Tj) ≤W
(2)
p,l,r (Tj)
and
(2.13) W
(6)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ [0, 1] .
Variable W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj) tells us whether the power plant is running at time Tj. If the power plant is not
running at time Tj , then by (2.3) and (2.12), W
(6)
p,l,r (Tj) = 0 and by (2.11) also Ŵp,l,r (Tj) = 0. On the
other hand, if the power plant is fully ramped up time Tj , then W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj) = 1 and W
(6)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ [0, 1],
and thus Ŵp,l,r (Tj) ∈
[
W
p,l,r
min (Tj) ,W
p,l,r
max (Tj)
]
.
2.1.2. Maximum ramp-up and maximum ramp-down constraints. Producer p ∈ P is
not able to arbitrarily choose her decision variables because there are some constraints that limit her
feasible set. The change in production of each power plant from one delivery period to next is limited
by the ramp-up and ramp-down constraints. For each j ∈ {1, ..., T ′ − 1}, where T ′ denotes the last
delivery period, l ∈ L and r ∈ Rp,l these constraints can be expressed as
(2.14) △W
p,l,r
min (Tj) ≤ Ŵp,l,r (Tj+1)− Ŵp,l,r (Tj) ≤ △W
p,l,r
max (Tj) ,
where △W
p,l,r
max and △W
p,l,r
min represent maximum rates for ramping up and down, respectively. The
ramping rates highly depend on the type of the power plant. Some gas power plants can increase
production from zero to the maximum in just a few minutes, while the same action may take days or
weeks for a nuclear power plant.
Using (2.11), we can rewrite Constraint (2.14) for all j ∈ {1, ..., T ′ − 1} as
(2.15)
W
p,l,r
min (Tj) ≤ W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj+1)W
p,l,r
min (Tj+1) +W
(6)
p,l,r (Tj+1)
(
W
p,l,r
max (Tj+1)−W
p,l,r
min (Tj+1)
)
−W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj)W
p,l,r
min (Tj)−W
(6)
p,l,r (Tj)
(
W
p,l,r
max (Tj)−W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
)
≤ △W
p,l,r
max (Tj) .
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Additionally, if the power plant is in a ramp-up phase, then it has to increase production and finish
the ramp-up phase as fast as possible. Such a requirement can be enforced as
(2.16) W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj+1) ≥ min
{
W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj) +
△W
p,l,r
max (Tj)
W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
, 1
}
where j ∈ {1, ..., T ′ − 1}. Since this constraint is relevant only during the ramp-up phase, we reformu-
late it for j ∈ {1, ..., T ′ − 1} as
(2.17) W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj+1) ≥ min
{
W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj) +
△W
p,l,r
max (Tj)
W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
, 1
}
−M1
(
1−W
(4)
p,l,r (Tj)
)
,
where M1 ≥ 1 +
△W
p,l,r
max(Tj)
W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
. Most of the available optimization solvers are not able to handle con-
straints that include min or max functions. Thus, we apply a well established approach to handle
logical constraints, and introduce a new binary decision variable W
(7)
p,l,r (Tj) as
(2.18) W
(7)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ [0, 1]
and
(2.19) W
(7)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ Z
where j ∈ J , that makes sure that at least one of the following constraints
(2.20) W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj+1) ≥W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj) +
△W
p,l,r
max (Tj)
W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
−M1
(
1−W
(4)
p,l,r (Tj)
)
−M2W
(7)
p,l,r (Tj)
and
(2.21) W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj+1) ≥ 1−M1
(
1−W
(4)
p,l,r (Tj)
)
−M2
(
1−W
(7)
p,l,r (Tj)
)
,
where M2 ≥ 1, is enforced.
Similarly, if a power plant is in the ramp-down phase, then it has to decrease production and finish
the ramp-down phase as fast as possible. Such requirement can be enforced as
(2.22) W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj+1) ≤ max
{
W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj)−
△W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
, 0
}
+M1
(
1−W
(5)
p,l,r (Tj)
)
for j ∈ {1, ..., T ′ − 1}. Most of the available optimization solvers are not able to handle constraints
that include min or max functions. We apply the approach described above and introduce a new
binary decision variable W
(8)
p,l,r (Tj) as
(2.23) W
(8)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ [0, 1]
and
(2.24) W
(8)
p,l,r (Tj) ∈ Z
where j ∈ J , that makes sure that at least one of the following constraints
(2.25) W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj+1) ≤W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj)−
△W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
+M1
(
1−W
(5)
p,l,r (Tj)
)
+M2W
(8)
p,l,r (Tj)
and
(2.26) W
(1)
p,l,r (Tj+1) ≤M1
(
1−W
(5)
p,l,r (Tj)
)
+M2
(
1−W
(8)
p,l,r (Tj)
)
is enforced.
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2.1.3. Other inequality constraints. We bound the the number of electricity contracts that
each producer is allowed to trade as
(2.27) −Vtrade ≤ Vp (ti, Tj) ≤ Vtrade
for some large Vtrade > 0. Trading of an infinite number of contracts would clearly lead to a bankruptcy
of one of the counterparties involved and must thus be prevented. In [21] it was shown, that if Vtrade
is chosen to be large enough, then Constraint (2.27) has no impact on the optimal solution and can
be eliminated from the problem.
2.1.4. Equality constraints. There are also equality constraints that connect power plant pro-
duction with electricity, fuel, and emission trading. For each j ∈ J the electricity sold in the forward
and spot market together must equal the actually produced electricity, i.e.
(2.28) −
∑
i∈Ij
Vp (ti, Tj) =
∑
l∈L
∑
r∈Rp,l
Ŵp,l,r (Tj) .
Each producer p ∈ P has to make sure that a sufficient amount of fuel l ∈ L has been bought to cover
the electricity production for each delivery period j ∈ J . Such constraint can be expressed as
(2.29)
∑
r∈Rp,l
Ŵp,l,r (Tj) c
p,l,r =
∑
i∈Ij
Fp,l (ti, Tj)
where cp,l,r > 0 is the efficiency of power plant r ∈ Rp,l.
The carbon emission obligation constraint can be written as
(2.30)
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈Ij
O (ti, Tj) =
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈L
∑
r∈Rp,l
Ŵp,l,r (Tj) g
p,l,r,
where gp,l,r > 0 denotes the carbon emission intensity factor for power plant r ∈ Rp,l. This constraint
ensures that enough emission certificates have been bought to cover the electricity production over the
whole planning horizon.
2.1.5. Producers’ optimization problem. The notation of the decision variables is greatly
simplified if they are concatenated into
• electricity trading vectors Vp (Tj) = ||i∈Ij Vp (ti, Tj) and Vp = ||j∈J Vp (Tj),
• fuel trading vectors Fp (ti, Tj) = ||l∈L Fp,l (ti, Tj), Fp (Tj) = ||i∈Ij Fp (ti, Tj), and
Fp = ||j∈J Fp (Tj),
• emission trading vectors Op (Tj) = ||i∈Ij Op (ti, Tj) and Op = ||j∈J Op (Tj),
• electricity production vectors Wp,l,r (Tj) = ||k∈{1,..,8}W
(k)
p,l,r (Tj),
Wp,l (Tj) = ||r∈Rp,l Wp,l,r (Tj), Wp (Tj) = ||l∈LWp,l (Tj), and Wp = ||j∈J Wp (Tj),
and finally vp =
[
V ⊤p , F
⊤
p , O
⊤
p ,W
⊤
p
]⊤
.
Similarly, the notation of the prices is greatly simplified if they are concatenated into
• electricity price vectors Π(Tj) = ||i∈Ij Π(ti, Tj), and Π = ||j∈J e
−rˆTjΠ(Tj), where rˆ ∈ R is a
constant interest rate,
• fuel price vectors G (ti, Tj) = ||l∈LGl (ti, Tj), G (Tj) = ||i∈Ij G (ti, Tj), and
G = ||j∈J e
−rˆTjG (Tj),
• emission price vector Gem (Tj) = ||i∈Ij Gem (ti, Tj), and Gem = ||j∈J e
−rˆTjGem (Tj),
• startup costs vector ŝp,l,r =
[
0, 0, sp,l,r, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
]⊤
, sp,l = ||r∈Rp,l ŝ
p,l,r, sp = ||l∈L s
p,l, and
ŝp = ||j∈J e
−rˆTjsp, where sp,l,r ≥ 0 denotes the startup costs of power plant r ∈ Rp,l,
and finally
pip =
[
Π⊤, G⊤, G⊤em, (ŝ
p)
⊤
]⊤
.
Any producers’ goal is to maximize their expected profit subject to a risk budget. In this work
we assume that the risk budget is expressed in a mean-variance framework. The main argument that
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supports this decision is that delta hedging, which is the most widely used hedging strategy, can be
captured in this framework.
The profit Pp (vp, pip) of producer p ∈ P can be calculated as
(2.31) Pp (vp, pip) =
∑
j∈J
e−rˆTj
∑
i∈Ij
P ti,Tjp (vp, pip)−
∑
l∈L
∑
r∈Rp,l
sp,l,rW
(3)
p,l,r (Tj)
 ,
where the profit P
ti,Tj
p (vp, pip) for each i ∈ Ij and j ∈ J can be calculated as
P ti,Tjp (vp, pip) = −Π(ti, Tj)Vp (ti, Tj)−Op (ti, Tj)Gem (ti, Tj)−
∑
l∈L
Gl (ti, Tj)Fp,l (ti, Tj) .
Under a mean-variance optimization framework, producers are interested in the mean-variance utility
Ψp (vp) = E
P [Pp (vp, pip)]−
λp
2 Var
P [Pp (vp, pip)]
= −EP [pip]
⊤
vp −
1
2λpv
⊤
p Qpvp,
where λp > 0 is their risk preference parameter and Qp := E
P
[(
pip − E
P [pip]
) (
pip − E
P [pip]
)⊤]
an
“extended” covariance matrix. Their objective is to solve the following optimization problem
(PR) Φp = max
vp
Ψp (vp)
subject to (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), (2.10), (2.12), (2.13), (2.15), (2.18), (2.19),
(2.20), (2.21), (2.23), (2.24), (2.25), (2.26), (2.27), (2.28), (2.29), and (2.30).
A standard approach to solving optimization problem with binary constraints is to consider its
continuous relaxation. We define a continuous relaxation of Problem (PR) as
(P˜R) Φp = maxvp
Ψp (vp)
subject to (2.2), (2.3), (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), (2.9), (2.12), (2.13), (2.15), (2.18), (2.20), (2.21), (2.25),
(2.26), (2.23), (2.27), (2.28), (2.29), and (2.30). Problem P˜R is the same as problem Problem (PR)
except that it does not include integrality constraints (2.4), (2.8), (2.10), (2.19) and (2.24).
2.2. Consumers. We make the assumption that demand is completely inelastic and that each
consumer c ∈ C is responsible for satisfying a proportion pc ∈ [0, 1] of the total demand D (Tj) at time
Tj, j ∈ J . Since pc is a proportion, we clearly have that
∑
c∈C pc = 1.
A number of electricity forward contracts consumer c ∈ C buys at trading time ti, i ∈ Ij for
delivery at time Tj, j ∈ J is denoted by Vc (ti, Tj).
2.2.1. Inequality constraints. We bound the the number of electricity contracts that each
consumer is allowed to trade as
(2.32) −Vtrade ≤ Vp (ti, Tj) ≤ Vtrade
for some large Vtrade > 0. Trading of an infinite number of contracts would clearly lead to a bankruptcy
of one of the counterparties involved and must thus be prevented. In [21] it was shown, that if Vtrade
is chosen large enough, then Constraint (2.32) has no impact on the optimal solution and can be
eliminated from the problem.
2.2.2. Equality constraints. Consumers are responsible for satisfying the electricity demand of
end users. The electricity demand is expected to be satisfied for each Tj , i.e.
(2.33)
∑
i∈Ij
Vc (ti, Tj) = pcD (Tj) .
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At the time of calculating the optimal decisions, consumers assume that they know the future realiza-
tion of demand D (Tj) precisely. If the knowledge about the future realization of the demand changes,
then players can take recourse actions by recalculating their optimal decisions with the updated de-
mand forecast. Consumers may assume that they will be able to execute the recourse actions, because
it is the job of the grid operator to ensure that a sufficient amount of electricity is available on the
market.
2.2.3. Consumers’ optimization problem. Similarly as for producers, we can simplify the
notation by introducing electricity trading vectors Vc (Tj) = ||i∈Ij Vc (ti, Tj) and Vc = ||j∈J Vc (Tj).
Consumers would like to maximize their profit subject to a risk budget. Similar to the model
we introduced for producers, we assume that the risk budget can be expressed in a mean-variance
framework. The profit of consumer c ∈ C can be calculated as
(2.34) Pc (Vc,Π) =
∑
j∈J
e−rˆTj
∑
i∈Ij
−Π(ti, Tj)Vc (ti, Tj) + scpcD (Tj)
 ,
where rˆ ∈ R denotes a constant interest rate and sc ∈ R denotes a contractually fixed price that
consumer c ∈ C receives for selling the electricity further to end users (e.g. households, businesses
etc.). Note that the contractually fixed price sc only affects the optimal objective value of consumer
c ∈ C, but not also her optimal solution. Since we are primarily interested in optimal solutions, we
simplify the notation and set sc = 0. The correct optimal value can always be calculated via post-
processing when an optimal solution is already known. This may be needed for risk management
purposes. Note that in reality, end users can change their electricity providers and consequently the
proportions pc, c ∈ C. One could model the end user electricity market with a similar equilibrium
model as presented here, but this is not the focus of this paper. Here we assume that proportions pc
are constant for the period of our interest.
Under a mean-variance optimization framework consumers are interested in the mean-variance
utility
Ψc (Vc) = E
P [Pc (Vc,Π)]−
λc
2 Var
P [Pc (Vc,Π)]
= −EP [Π]⊤ Vc −
λc
2 V
⊤
c QcVc,
where λc > 0 is their risk preference and Qc := E
P
[(
Π− EP [Π]
) (
Π− EP [Π]
)⊤]
a covariance matrix.
Their objective is to solve the following optimization problem
(CO) Φc = max
Vc
Ψc (Vc)
subject to (2.32) and (2.33).
2.3. Matrix notation. The analysis of the problem is greatly simplified if a more compact
notation is introduced.
Equality constraints of producer p ∈ P can be expressed as
Apvp = 0
and inequality constraints as
Bpvp ≤ bp
for some Ap ∈ R
|J|(|L|+1)+1×dim vp , Bp ∈ R
np×dim vp and bp ∈ R
np , where np denotes the number of
the inequality constraints of producer p ∈ P . Define feasible sets
S˜p := {vp : Apvp = ap and Bpvp ≤ bp}
and
Sp :=
{
vp : Apvp = ap and Bpvp ≤ bp and [vp]i ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ I
}
,
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where I denotes a set of decisions variables with binarity constraints (i.e. W
(k)
p,l,r (Tj) for all k ∈
{2, 4, 5, 7, 8}, r ∈ Rp,l and for all j ∈ J).
It is useful to investigate the inner structure of the matrices. By considering equality constraints
(2.28), (2.29), and (2.30) we can see that
(2.35) Ap =
[
Aˆ1 0 Aˆ3,p
0 Aˆ2 Aˆ4,p
]
where Aˆ1 ∈ R
|J|×N , Aˆ2 ∈ R
(|J||L|+1)×N(|L|+1), Aˆ3,p ∈ R
|J|×dimWp , Aˆ4,p ∈ R
(|J||L|+1)×dimWp . One can
see that matrices Aˆ1 and Aˆ2 are independent of producer p ∈ P and matrices Aˆ3,p and Aˆ4,p depend
on producer p ∈ P . One can further investigate the structure of Aˆ1 and see
(2.36) Aˆ1 =
 11 0. . .
0 1|J|
 ,
where 1j, j ∈ J is a row vector of ones of length |Ij |. Similarly,
(2.37) Aˆ2 =

Aˆ1 · · · 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · Aˆ1 0
0 · · · 0 1N
 ,
where the number of rows in the block notation above is |L| + 1. The first |L| rows correspond to
(2.29) and the last row corresponds to (2.30).
The profit of producer p ∈ P can be written as
Pp (vp, pip) = −pi
⊤
p vp.
In a compact notation, the mean-variance utility of producer p ∈ P can be calculated as
Ψp
(
vp,E
P [Π]
)
= EP
[
−pi⊤p vp −
1
2λpv
⊤
p
(
pip − E
P [pip]
) (
pip − E
P [pip]
)⊤
vp
]
= −EP [pip]
⊤
vp −
1
2λpv
⊤
p Qpvp,
where
(2.38) Qp := E
P
[(
pip − E
P [pip]
) (
pip − E
P [pip]
)⊤]
.
The inner structure of matrix Qp is the following
(2.39) Qp =
 Qˆ1 Qˆ2 0Qˆ⊤2 Qˆ3 0
0 0 0

where Qˆ1 ∈ R
N×N , Qˆ2 ∈ R
N×(dimBp+dimOp) = RN×N(|L|+1), Qˆ3 ∈ R
N(|L|+1)×N(|L|+1). One can see
that Qˆ1, Qˆ2, and Qˆ3 do not depend on producer p ∈ P . The size of the larger matrix Qp depends on
producer p ∈ P , because different producers have different number of power plants.
Producer p ∈ P attempts to solve the following optimization problem
Φp
(
E
P [Π]
)
= max
vp∈Sp
− EP [pip]
⊤
vp −
1
2
λpv
⊤
p Qpvp,
with the following continuous relaxation
Φp
(
E
P [Π]
)
= max
vp∈S˜p
− EP [pip]
⊤
vp −
1
2
λpv
⊤
p Qpvp.
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The equality constraints of consumer c ∈ C can be expressed as
AcVc = ac
and the inequality constraints as
BcVc ≤ bc
where Ac = Aˆ1, Bc ∈ R
2N×N , ac ∈ R
|J| and bc ∈ R
2N . Define a feasible set
Sc :=
{
Vc ∈ R
N : AcVc = ac and BcVc ≤ bc
}
.
The profit of consumer c ∈ C can be written as
Pc (Vc,Π) = −Π
⊤Vc.
In a compact notation, the mean-variance utility of a consumer c ∈ C can be calculated as
Ψc
(
Vc,E
P [Π]
)
= EP
[
−Π⊤Vc −
1
2λcV
⊤
c
(
Π− EP [Π]
) (
Π− EP [Π]
)⊤
Vc
]
= −EP [Π]
⊤
Vc −
λc
2 V
⊤
c QcVc,
where
(2.40) Qc := E
P
[(
Π− EP [Π]
) (
Π− EP [Π]
)⊤]
.
Moreover, note that Qc = Qˆ1 for all c ∈ C. We set sc = 0, w.l.o.g. Consumer c ∈ C attempts to solve
the following optimization problem
Φc
(
E
P [Π]
)
= max
Vc∈Sc
− EP [Π]
⊤
Vc −
λc
2
V ⊤c QcVc.
2.4. The hypothetical market agent. Given the price vectors of electricity Π, fuel G, and
emissions Gem, each producer p ∈ P and each consumer c ∈ C can calculate their optimal electricity
trading vectors Vp and Vc by solving (PR) and (CO), respectively. However, the players are not
necessary able to execute their calculated optimal trading strategies because they may not find the
counterparty to trade with. In reality each contract consists of a buyer and a seller, which imposes
an additional constraint (also called the market clearing constraint) that matches the number of short
and long electricity contracts for each i ∈ Ij and j ∈ J as follows,
(2.41)
∑
c∈C
Vc (ti, Tj) +
∑
p∈P
Vp (ti, Tj) = 0.
The electricity market is responsible for satisfying this constraint by matching buyers with sellers.
The matching is done through sharing of the price and order book information among all market
participants. If at the current price there are more long contract than short contracts, it means that
the current price is too low and asks will start to be submitted at higher prices. The converse occurs,
if there are more short contracts than long contracts. Eventually, the electricity price at which the
number of long and short contracts matches is found. At such a price the constraint (2.41) is satisfied
“naturally” without explicitly requiring the players to satisfy it. They do so because it is in their best
interest, i.e. it maximizes their mean-variance objective functions.
The question is how to formulate such an equilibrium constraint in an optimization framework. A
naive approach of writing the market clearing constraint as an ordinary constraint forces the players to
satisfy it regardless of the price. We need a mechanism that models the matching of buyers and sellers
as it is performed by the electricity market. For this purpose, we introduce a hypothetical market
agent who is allowed to slowly change electricity prices to ensure that (2.41) is satisfied.
Let the hypothetical market agent have the following profit function
(2.42)
PM (Π, V ) =
∑
j∈J e
−rˆTj
[∑
i∈Ij
Π(ti, Tj)
(∑
c∈C Vc (ti, Tj) +
∑
p∈P Vp (ti, Tj)
)]
= EP [Π]
⊤
(∑
c∈C Vc +
∑
p∈P Vp
)
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and the expected profit
(2.43) ΨM
(
E
P [Π] , V
)
= EP [PM (V,Π)] ,
where V =
[
V ⊤P , V
⊤
C
]⊤
, VP = ||p∈P Vp, and VC = ||c∈C Vc and let the hypothetical market agent
attempts to solve
(2.44) ΦM (V ) = max
EP[Π]
ΨM
(
E
P [Π] , V
)
.
The KKT conditions for (2.44) in the matrix notation read
(2.45)
∑
c∈C
Vc +
∑
p∈P
Vp = 0,
which is exactly the same as (2.41). Note, that the equivalence of (2.41) and (2.44) is a theoretical result
that has to be applied with caution in an algorithmic framework. Formulation (2.44) is clearly unstable
since only a small mismatch in the market clearing constraint sends the prices to ±∞. Thus, a stable
formulation of the hypothetical market agent must be found. Let us now analyze the hypothetical
market agent with the following, slightly altered, optimization problem
(HMA)
max
EP[Π]
ΨM
(
E
P [Π] , V
)
s.t.
∑
c∈C Vc +
∑
p∈P Vp = 0
µM = 0,
where µM denotes the dual variables of the equality constraint in (HMA). It is trivial to check that the
optimality conditions for (HMA) correspond to (2.41). Formulation (HMA) is clearly stable, because
the market clearing constraint is satisfied precisely. The equality constraint on the dual variables makes
sure that the optimal solution remains the same if the market clearing constraint is removed after the
calculation of the optimal solution. Formulation (HMA) is used as a definition of the hypothetical
market agent in the rest of this work.
We can see that, by affecting the expected electricity price, the hypothetical agent changes the
electricity price process. It is not immediately clear how to construct such a stochastic process or
that such a stochastic process exists at all. We refer the reader to [21], where a constructive proof of
the existence is given. The proof is based on the Doob decomposition theorem, where we allow the
hypothetical market agent to control an integrable predictable term of the process, while keeping the
martingale term of the process intact.
For the further argumentation we define vP = ||p∈P vp and v =
[
v⊤P , V
⊤
C
]⊤
.
2.5. Nash equilibrium. Binarity constraints (2.4), (2.8), (2.10), (2.19) and (2.24) of each pro-
ducer significantly complicate the analysis of Problem (PR) and thus, we focus on the continuous
relaxation (P˜R) instead. We then show through various numerical results in Section 3 and Section
4.2, that binarity constraints (2.4), (2.8), (2.10), (2.19) and (2.24) do not have a significant impact on
the equilibrium electricity price.
Using the continuous relaxation (P˜R), we are interested in finding a Nash equilibrium defined as
Definition 2.1. Nash Equilibrium (NE)
Decisions v∗ and EP [Π]
∗
constitute a Nash equilibrium if
1. For every producer p ∈ P , v∗p is a strategy such that
(2.46) Ψp
(
vp,E
P [Π]∗
)
≤ Ψp
(
v∗p,E
P [Π]∗
)
for all vp ∈ S˜p;
2. For every consumer c ∈ C, V ∗c is a strategy such that
(2.47) Ψc
(
Vc,E
P [Π]∗
)
≤ Ψc
(
V ∗c ,E
P [Π]∗
)
for all Vc ∈ Sc;
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3. Price vector EP [Π]
∗
maximizes the objective function of the hypothetical market agent, i.e.
(2.48) ΨM
(
E
P [Π] , v∗
)
≤ ΨM
(
E
P [Π]
∗
, v∗
)
for all EP [Π] ∈ SM .
From Definition (2.1), it is not clear whether a NE for our problem exists and whether it is unique.
This problem was thoroughly investigated in [21]. Roughly speaking, it was shown that if the demand
of the end users can be covered by the available system of power plants, then a NE exists. Moreover,
if the power plants are similar enough (if there are no big gaps in the efficiency of the power plants),
then one can show that the NE is also unique. On the other hand, if power plants are similar enough,
then the expected equilibrium price of each electricity contract might be an interval instead of a single
point.
In this paper we focus on the numerical calculation of the NE under the assumption of the existence
of solution. For this paper, we assume the following, a slightly stricter, condition.
Assumption 2.2. For all p ∈ P , the exists vector vp such that Apvp = ap a.s. and Bpvp < bp
a.s., for all c ∈ C, there exists vector Vc such that AcVc = ac a.s. and BcVc < bc a.s., and the vectors
Vp and Vc can be chosen so that (2.45) is satisfied.
2.6. Quadratic programming formulation. The traditional approach to solving equilibrium
optimization problems is through shadow prices (see [8] for example). However, this approach is only
valid when no inequality constraints are present. Shadow prices depend on the set of active constraints
and thus one can only use this approach when the active set is known. In inequality constrainted
optimization, the active set is usually not know in advance and thus a different approach is needed.
The proposed formulation below can be seen as an extension of the shadow price concept to inequality
constrained optimization problems.
A naive approach for solving inequality constrained equilibrium optimization problem would be to
choose an expected price vector EP [Π] and then calculate optimal solutions for each producer p ∈ P and
each consumer c ∈ C by solving (P˜R) and (CO), respectively. If at such price
∥∥∥∑c∈C Vc +∑p∈P Vp∥∥∥ is
close to zero, then the solution is found and EP [Π] is an equilibrium expected price vector. Otherwise,
we have to adjust the expected price vector and repeat the procedure. We can see that such an
algorithm is costly, because it requires to solve a large optimization problem (i.e. to calculate the
optimal solutions of each producer and each consumer) multiple times. In the section below, we show
that we can do much better than the naive approach. Using the reformulation we propose, the large
optimization problem must be solved only once.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for all vk, k ∈ P ∪ C and E
P [Π] to constitute a NE are the
following, due to the fact that Assumption 2.2 implies the Slater condition,
(2.49)
−EP [pik]
⊤
− λkQkvk −B
⊤
k ηk −A
⊤
k µk = 0
η⊤k (Bkvk − bk) = 0
Bkvk − bk ≤ 0
Akvk − ak = 0
ηk ≥ 0∑
c∈C Vc +
∑
p∈P Vp = 0.
The last equation corresponds to the KKT conditions of the hypothetical market agent.
We can now interpret (2.49) as the KKT conditions of one large optimization problem that includes
the new definition (HMA) of the hypothetical market agent. To see this, we join all decision variables
into one vector x :=
[
v⊤,EP [Π]
⊤
]⊤
and rewrite
• the equality constraints as Ax = a with a :=
a⊤p1 , ..., a⊤pP , a⊤c1 , ..., a⊤cC , 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
⊤where the
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number of ending zeros is equal to N , and
A :=

Ap1 0 0
0
. . . 0
...
0 ApP 0 0
0 Ac1 0 0
0
. . . 0
...
0 AcC 0
Mp1 · · · MpP I · · · I 0

,
where Mp ∈ R
N × Rdim vp is a matrix defined as
Mp =
diag
1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0
 ,
• the inequality constraints as Bx ≤ b with b :=
[
b⊤p1 , ..., b
⊤
pP
, b⊤c1 , ..., b
⊤
cC
]⊤
, and
B :=

Bp1 0 0
0
. . . 0
...
0 BpP 0 0
0 Bc1 0 0
0
. . . 0
...
0 BcC 0

,
• the objective function as −pi⊤x − 12x
⊤Qx with pi :=
EP [pi0,p1 ]⊤ , ...,EP [pi0,pP ]⊤ , 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(|C|+1)N

⊤
where pi0,p is pip with elements of Π set to zero, and
(2.50) Q :=

λp1Qp1 0 M
⊤
p1
0
. . . 0
...
0 λpPQpP 0 M
⊤
pP
0 λc1Qc1 0 I
0
. . . 0
...
0 λcCQcC I
Mp1 · · · MpP I · · · I 0

,
• the dual variables as η :=
[
η⊤p1 , ..., η
⊤
pP
, η⊤c1 , ..., η
⊤
cC
]
and µ :=
[
µ⊤p1 , ..., µ
⊤
pP
, µ⊤c1 , ..., µ
⊤
cC
, µ⊤M
]
.
In this setting we can reformulate the KKT conditions (2.49) as follows,
(2.51)
−pi −Qx−B⊤η −A⊤µ = 0
η⊤ (Bx − b) = 0
Bx− b ≤ 0
Ax − a = 0
η ≥ 0
µM = 0.
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Since the additional constraints µM = 0 on the dual variables of Problem 2.51 cannot be handled
by most of the available quadratic programming solvers, we have to reformulate the problem in a dual
form. We start by formulating the optimization problem out of the KKT conditions (2.51) as
(2.52)
max
x
−pi⊤x− 12x
⊤Qx
s.t. Ax = a
Bx ≤ b
µM = 0
and by defining the Lagrangian as
L (x, µ, η) =
 −
1
2x
⊤Qx− pi⊤x− (Ax − a)
⊤
µ− (Bx− b)
⊤
η; if η ≥ 0
−∞; otherwise.
One can show that, Q  0 for all vectors that satisfy the market clearing constraint (2.41) (for the
proof see [20]). L (x, µ, η) is therefore a smooth and convex function. The unconstrained minimizer
can be determined by solving DxL (x, µ, η) = 0. Calculating
DxL (x, µ, η) = −Qx− pi −A
⊤µ− B⊤η
and inserting pi back to the Lagrangian, an equivalent formulation is obtained as follows,
L (x, µ, η) =

1
2x
⊤Qx+ a⊤µ+ b⊤η if η ≥ 0 and −Qx− pi −A⊤µ−B⊤η = 0,
−∞ otherwise
Relating the latter to a maximization optimization problem, the following formulation is obtained
(2.53)
max
x,µ,η
− 12x
⊤Qx− µ⊤a− η⊤b
s.t. Qx+A⊤µ+B⊤λ+ pi = 0
η ≥ 0
µM = 0.
Problem (2.53) is equivalent to Problem (2.52), but it can be solved using any quadratic programming
algorithm.
Based on our discussion in Section 2.5, we can see that (2.53) was obtained by considering Problem
(P˜R), which is a continuous relaxation of Problem (PR). To estimate the error caused by the continuous
relaxation, we use the following procedure:
1. We calculate the equilibrium electricity price EP [Π]
∗
by solving problem (2.53).
2. Using the equilibrium electricity price EP [Π]
∗
from the previous step, we calculate optimal
trading vectors V ∗p , p ∈ P for all producers and optimal trading vectors V
∗
c , c ∈ C for all
consumers by solving (PR) and (CO), respectively.
3. We calculate the error as
(2.54) MIQP :=
∑
c∈C
V ∗c +
∑
p∈P
V ∗p .
In order to verify the procedure above, we apply the following very similar procedure:
1. We calculate the equilibrium electricity price EP [Π]∗ by solving problem (2.53).
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2. Using the equilibrium electricity price EP [Π]
∗
from the previous step, we calculate optimal
trading vectors V ∗p , p ∈ P for all producers and optimal trading vectors V
∗
c , c ∈ C for all
consumers by solving (P˜R) and (CO), respectively.
3. We calculate the error as
(2.55) QP :=
∑
c∈C
V ∗c +
∑
p∈P
V ∗p .
In Section 3 and Section 4.2, we present the MIQP and QP when modeling the entire UK power grid.
3. Numerical results. In this section we discuss the numerical results and apply our model from
Section 2 to model the realistic UK power grid.
3.1. Estimation of parameters. In this section we investigate how to estimate various param-
eters of power plants that enter our model described in Section 2.
In the UK all power plants are required to submit their available capacity as well as ramp-up and
ramp-down constraints to the grid operator on a half hourly basis. This data is publicly available at the
Elexon website1. A more challenging problem is to estimate of the efficiency cp,l,r, startup costs sp,l,r
and the carbon emission intensity factor gp,l,r for each power plant r ∈ Rp,l. For the purpose of the
calibration, we assume that all producers are risk neutral and set λp = 0 for all p ∈ P . Furthermore,
we neglect the ramp-up and ramp-down constraints (2.15), (2.20), (2.21), (2.25), and (2.26). Since
each power plant is treated separately, we avoid writing subscripts/superscripts p, l, r.
Before we explore the details of the calibration process, let us establish a few relationships that
will prove useful later in this section. We can see that a power plant will produce at time Tj if the
income from selling electricity at the spot price is greater than the costs of purchasing the required
fuel and emission certificates at the current spot price (remember that a power plant has to cover the
startup costs too). Thus, for a power plant that runs on fuel l ∈ L and produces electricity at time Tj,
(3.1) Π(Tj, Tj)− cGl (Tj , Tj)− gGem (Tj , Tj) > 0
must hold for production to take place.
It is immediately clear why (3.1) must hold when only spot contracts are available. Let us inves-
tigate why (3.1) holds also if forward and future electricity contracts are available on the market. At
any trading time ti, i ∈ Ij , a rational producer could enter into a short electricity forward contract
and simultaneously into a long fuel and emission forward contract if
(3.2) Π(ti, Tj)− cGl (ti, Tj)− gGem (ti, Tj) > 0.
At delivery time Tj , this producer has two options:
• To acquire the delivery of the fuel and emission certificates bought at trading time ti and
produce electricity. In this case, she observes the following profit
(3.3) P̂1 (Tj) = Π (ti, Tj)− cGl (ti, Tj)− gGem (ti, Tj) .
• To produce no electricity and instead close the forward electricity, fuel, and emission contracts.
In this case, she observes the following profit
(3.4)
P̂2 (Tj) = [Π (ti, Tj)−Π(Tj , Tj)]− c [Gl (ti, Tj)−Gl (Tj , Tj)]
−g [Gem (ti, Tj)−Gem (Tj , Tj)] .
Power plant r ∈ Rp,l will run at Tj if and only if
(3.5) P̂1 (Tj) > P̂2 (Tj) .
With some reordering of the terms, it is easy to see that inequality (3.5) is equivalent to inequality
(3.1).
1http://www.bmreports.com/
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Using the reasoning above, we can conclude that, for the purpose of determining the stack, it is
enough to focus only on spot electricity, fuel and emission contracts. By taking into account startup
costs and equations described in Section 2.1, the profit maximization problem of each power plant can
be written as
(3.6) max
W (2),W (4),W (6)
∑
j∈J
Ŵ (Tj)P (Tj)−W
(4) (Tj) s
subject to
W (4) (Tj) ≥W
(2) (Tj)−W
(2) (Tj−1) ,∀j ∈ J\ {1}(3.7)
W (6) (Tj) ≤W
(2) (Tj) ,∀j ∈ J(3.8)
W (k) (Tj) ∈ [0, 1] ,∀j ∈ J, k ∈ {2, 4, 6}(3.9)
W (2) (Tj) ∈ Z,∀j ∈ J,(3.10)
where
(3.11) Ŵ (Tj) =W
(2) (Tj)Wmin (Tj) +W
(6) (Tj)
(
Wmax (Tj)−Wmin (Tj)
)
, ∀j ∈ J
and
(3.12) P¯ (Tj) = Π (Tj , Tj)− cG (Tj , Tj)− gGem (Tj , Tj) , ∀j ∈ J.
Note that we do not have to impose the integrality constraints for variable W (4) (Tj) j ∈ J , because
they are implied by (3.10) and (3.7). To account for the neglected risk premium, trading costs,
maintenance costs etc. we introduce an additional constant m > 0 and include it in (3.12) as
(3.13) P¯ (Tj) = Π (Tj, Tj)− cG (Tj, Tj)− gGem (Tj , Tj)−m, ∀j ∈ J.
We are interested to know how the optimal solution of Problem (3.6) depends on parameters c, g,
m, and s. Let Ŵ ∗ (Tj; c, g,m, s) denote the optimal production of Problem (3.6). Our task is to find
c, g, m, and s that satisfy
(3.14) min
c,g,m,s
∑
j∈J
(
Ŵ ∗ (Tj; c, g,m, s)− W˜ (Tj)
)2
where W˜ (Tj) denotes observed historical production of a power plant. The optimization problem is
a bi-level optimization problem where (3.14) corresponds to the outer optimization problem and (3.6)
corresponds to the inner optimization problem. Traditionally, such problems have been very difficult
to solve, because they are highly non-convex and the process of finding the optimal solution of the
outer optimization problem requires many expensive evaluations of the inner integer programming
optimization problem. However, we can show that in our case a difficult integer programming problem
can be replaced by a tractable linear programming problem without affecting the optimal solution.
We can use the following proposition to see that optimal solution of Problem (3.6) can be calculated
by a linear programming relaxation.
Proposition 3.1. The matrix of constraints (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9) for Problem (3.6) is totally
unimodular.
Proof. Let us write the matrix of inequality constraints (3.7) and (3.8) as
(3.15) [A1A2A3]
 W (2)W (6)
W (4)
 ≤ 0
for some block matrices A1, A2, and A3. We will first show that matrix [A1A2] is totally unimodular.
Note that all entries are {−1, 0, 1}. Moreover, each row contains exactly two non-zero entries. One of
the entries is 1 and the other is −1. These are sufficient conditions for matrix [A1A2] to be totally
unimodular. It is trivial to see that A3 = P
[
I 0
0 0
]
Q for some permutation matrices P and Q of
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the appropriate size. This implies that matrix [A1A2A3] is totally unimodular. The bound constraints
(3.9) can be included by using a similar argument.
By the virtue of Proposition 3.1, we can relax the binarity constraints and reformulate Problem
(3.6) as an linear programming problem as
(3.16)
max
W (2),W (4),W (6)
∑
j∈J Ŵ (Tj)P (Tj)−W
(4) (Tj) s
s.t. W (4) (Tj) ≥W
(2) (Tj)−W
(2) (Tj−1) , ∀j ∈ J\ {1}
W (6) (Tj) ≤W
(2) (Tj) , ∀j ∈ J
W (k) (Tj) ∈ [0, 1] , k ∈ {2, 4, 6} , ∀j ∈ J.
A combination of a particle swarm algorithm [22] and Gurobi [13] was used to solve the bi-level
optimization problem (3.16) in practice. Particle swarm was applied to the outer and Gurobi to the
inner optimization problem.
For each power plant we used over 5000 training samples obtained from the period between
1/1/2012 and 1/1/2013.
3.2. UK power grid. In this section we apply our model to the entire system of the UK power
plants. We focus on the coal, gas, and oil power plants, because these power plants adapt their
production to cover the changes in demand and are thus responsible for setting the price. Nuclear power
plants do not have to be modeled explicitly because their ramp-up and ramp-down constraints are so
tight that their production is almost constant over time. They usually deviate from the maximum
production only for maintenance reasons. Renewable sources and interconnectors are not modeled
explicitly, because they require a different treatment not covered in this paper. In this section, we
define demand D (Tj) for all j ∈ J as
(3.17) D (Tj) := Dact (Tj)− Prenw (Tj)− Pinter (Tj)
whereDact (Tj) denotes the actual demand in the UK power system, Prenw (Tj) denotes the production
from all renewable sources including wind, solar, biomass, hydro and pumped storage, and Pinter (Tj)
denotes the inflow of power into the UK power system through interconnectors. To make this model
useful in practice one has to model each of these terms, but this exceeds the scope of this paper.
Our goal is to calculate the electricity spot price with the information available on 11/2/2013. We
are interested in a delivery period from 4/4/2013 00:00:00 to 8/4/2013 00:00:00. We assume that there
are two types of power contract available. The first is a month ahead contract traded on 15/3/2013
17:00:00 and covers the delivery over all four days. The second type is a spot contract that requires
an immediate delivery and is traded for each half hour separately. We use future prices of coal, gas,
and oil as available on 11/2/2013. Since the historical demand forecast is not available, we used the
realized demand instead, which is a standard practice in the literature. To use this model in practice,
one could use a demand forecast available at the Elexon webpage2 or develop a new approach. Since
we do not have the information about the ownership of the power plants, we assumed that there is
only one producer who owns all power plants connected to the UK grid and only one consumer that
is responsible for satisfying the demand of the end users. In reality, market participants have more
information about the ownership that can be incorporated into the model. We set λk = 10
−7 for all
k ∈ P ∪ C. The impact of the risk aversion of producers and consumers is thoroughly investigated
in [20]. As described in the previous section, we estimated parameters c, g, m, and s for each power
plant from 5000 training samples obtained in the period between 1/1/2012 and 1/1/2013.
To motivate the inclusion of startup costs we first investigate a simplified version of our model
described in Section 2 and neglect the startup costs. Figure 3.1 shows the output of our model, when all
startup costs are set to zero. The figure on the left hand side depicts the calculated energy mix between
coal and gas power plants, while the figure on the right hand side depicts the actually observed energy
mix. Both figures contain also the spot price calculated by our model and the actually observed spot
price. The difference between calculated and observed production for each fuel is depicted in Figure
2http://www.bmreports.com/
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Figure 3.1. Comparison of the calculated and historical electricity price and energy mix when startup costs are
excluded (i.e. set to zero).
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Figure 3.2. The difference between calculated and observed gas and coal production.
3.2. We can see that our model predicts the energy mix very closely. Moreover, the daily pattern of the
electricity price predicted by our model is similar to the actually observed one. The model correctly
predicted that the electricity price is higher during the peak hours than during the off peak hours.
Furthermore, the calculated electricity price has two daily peaks that occur at almost the same time
as in the historically observed price.
The graphs also reveal a few problems of our model. Firstly, we can see that our model under-
estimates spot prices during peak hours and overestimates them during the off-peak hours. A similar
results was also found in [15]. Secondly, the two spikes in the observed price are not captured in our
model. This motivated us to extend our model and incorporate the startup costs of the power plants.
For the purpose of calibration, we applied the approach described in Section 3.1.
Calculated equilibrium prices and the energy mix with startup costs included are depicted in Figure
3.3. By comparing Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.3, we can see that the calculated equilibrium price captures
the daily variations of the actually observed price much more closely. It correctly predicts some of the
spikes, but also forecasts many false positives. Figure 3.4 shows that the inclusion of startup costs
slightly improved the error in the energy mix calculation.
It is interesting to explore the conditions of the electricity grid at times when the spikes in the
electricity price occur. A very descriptive parameter is standing reserve SR (Tj), j ∈ J , defined as
(3.18) SR (Tj) =
∑
p∈P
∑
l∈L
∑
r∈Rp,l
[
W
(2)
p,l,r (Tj)−W
(6)
p,l,r (Tj)
] [
W
p,l,r
max (Tj)−W
p,l,r
min (Tj)
]
,
which quantifies by how much the power plants that are currently running can increase their production
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Figure 3.3. Comparison of the calculated and historical electricity price and energy mix when startup costs are
included.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
−2000
−1500
−1000
−500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
 
 
Coal Error
Gas Error
Figure 3.4. The difference between calculated and observed gas and coal production after including startup costs.
before a new power plant must be turned on. Since most of the power plants have severe constraints
on startup times, low standing reserve usually implies low stability of the electricity grid.
Figure 3.5 depicts the calculated standing reserve over the relevant time period. We can see that
all price spikes occur when standing reserve is close to zero. In such situations, a new power plant must
be turned on (and off quickly afterwards) to cover the temporary extra demand. Thus, the startup
costs are spread over a very short period of time, and a high electricity price is required for such an
action to be profitable. However, in reality, the times of a low standing reserve are very rare. The
grid operator is responsible for providing a reliable electricity delivery and preventing times with a
low standing reserve. This is achieved by incentivizing some of the power plants to start production
even when it is not profitable for them. The costs of such actions are distributed among all market
participants. How to include the grid operator in our model is discussed in the next section.
In the remaining part of this section, we evaluate the error caused by using the continuous relax-
ation of Problem (PR). We follow the procedure described in Section 2.6. The MIQP error is depicted
by a dashed line in Figure 3.6. To estimate the effect of numerical errors, we also calculated the QP
error which is shown in Figure 3.6 as a solid line.
We can see from Figure 3.6 that
∥∥∥∑c∈C V ∗c +∑p∈P V ∗p ∥∥∥
∞
≈ 400MWh. Also in reality, production
and consumption do not match exactly. The mismatch is reflected through changes in the power line
frequency. In the UK, the nominal power line frequency is 50 Hz. The grid operator, called National
Grid, is responsible for keeping the frequency within ±1%3 of the nominal power line frequency. We
3See http://www2.nationalgrid.com/uk/services/balancing-services/frequency-response/.
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Figure 3.6. Error caused by considering Problem P˜R instead of Problem PR.
can see from Figure 3.6 that the largest errors occur at times when demand is high. Since the overall
demand for electricity during the peak hours is approximately 40GW we can conclude that the error
is within ±1% error bound.
The model presented in this paper neglects the losses of electricity in transmission and distribution
lines. According to the World Bank4 the transmission and distribution losses in the UK account for
approximately 7.5% (maximum 8.5% in 2004 and minimum 7.0% in 2010) of the total electricity
production. The losses vary in time and can change for ±1%.
Due to the reasons above, we believe that for the purpose of modeling realistic power prices, it is
enough to consider the continuous relaxation of Problem (PR) and neglect binarity constraints.
4. Grid operator. In Section 2, we investigated how to include startup costs in our model. The
calculated equilibrium price contained many spikes, which are in reality prevented by intervention of
the grid operator. In times, when the standing reserve is low, the grid operator incentivizes additional
power plants to turn on and thus help making the delivery of electricity more reliable. In this section
we investigate how to incorporate the actions of the grid operator into our model.
4.1. Quadratic programming formulation. The costs of the grid operator’s actions that help
to maintain a high reliability of the delivery of electricity are distributed among all market participants.
All market participants are collectively penalized in the situations when the standing reserve is low.
4See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS/countries/GB?display=graph.
20
To include the penalization in our model, we propose a quadratic penalty function Υ(SR (Tj)) defined
as
(4.1) Υ(SR (Tj)) := α (max {0, β − SR (Tj)})
2
,
where α > 0 and β > 0 are used to describe a risk aversion of the grid operator. Parameter β tells us
at what level of the standing reserve does the grid operator start to take action. Parameter α tells us
how much is the grid operator willing to incentivize the power plant to start production.
One can incorporate the grid operator into Problem (2.52) as
(4.2)
max
x
−pi⊤x− 12x
⊤Qx−
∑
j∈J Υ(SR (Tj))
s.t. Ax = a
Bx ≤ b
µM = 0
It might not be immediately clear, how to write the penalty term (4.1) in a quadratic programming
framework. We can follow an approach that is widely used in the linear programming literature and
introduce a decision variable z (Tj) with the following constraints
(4.3)
z (Tj) ≥ 0
z (Tj) ≥ β − SR (Tj) ,
which hold for each j ∈ J . The penalty function Υ(SR (Tj)) can be written as a function of z (Tj) as
(4.4) Υ(z (Tj)) := αz (Tj)
2
,
which fits into the quadratic programming framework.
One can apply the procedure described in Section 2.6 to find a more convenient dual formulation
of Problem (4.2).
4.2. Numerical results. In this section we investigate numerical results after inclusion of the
grid operator. Calculated equilibrium prices and the energy mix and depicted in Figure 4.1. The
figure on the left hand side depicts the calculated energy mix between coal and gas power plants, while
the figure on the right hand side depicts the actually observed energy mix. Both figures contain also
the spot price calculated by our model and the actually observed spot price. We set α = 0.01 and
β = 1500. Determination of the optimal standing reserve is a challenging problem, which has received
a lot of attention in the literature (see [10] and [9] for example) and exceeds the scope this paper.
By comparing Figure 3.3 and Figure 4.1, we can see that the calculated equilibrium electricity price
in Figure 4.1 follows the daily variations much more closely. The calculated equilibrium electricity
price does not contain any spikes, because the grid operator prevented them by managing the standing
reserve. In our model, we assume that the players (and the grid operator) have a perfect demand
forecast. However, in reality this is usually not the case. The grid operator is not able to predict the
demand perfectly, and corrective actions are often required. When large corrective action is required
at times close to delivery, then only a few (usually rather inefficient Open Cycle Gas Turbine) power
plants are flexible enough to cover the demand, which causes spikes in the electricity price. Modeling
of recursive actions exceeds the scope of this paper and is left for future work.
Figure 4.2 shows that the inclusion of the grid operator did not have any significant impact on the
error in the energy mix.
Figure 4.3 shows the standing reserve after inclusion of the grid operator. The standing reserve
never reaches zero since the grid operator prevents this by requiring new power plants to start produc-
tion to ensure stability of the electricity grid. This makes the spot price smoother and significantly
decreases the number of spikes.
Figure 4.4 depicts the MIQP and QP errors after inclusion of the grid operator. By comparing
Figure 3.6 and Figure 4.4, we can see that the inclusion of the grid operator has a small impact on the
errors, which remained within ±1% error bound.
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Figure 4.1. Comparison of the calculated and historical electricity price and energy mix with startup costs and
the grid operator included.
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Figure 4.2. The difference between calculated and observed gas and coal production after including the grid operator.
5. Conclusions. In this paper we proposed a tractable quadratic programming formulation for
calculating the equilibrium term structure of electricity prices when the startup costs of power plants
are included in the model. Through numerical simulations we showed that startup costs have a
large impact on electricity prices. When startup costs are included in the model, the calculated spot
electricity price during peak hours increased and during off-peak hours decreased. Moreover, startup
costs are responsible for introducing frequent high spikes in the spot electricity price.
We observed that price spikes occur at times when the standing reserve in low. In reality, the times
of a low standing reserve are rare, because of the intervention of the grid operator, who is responsible
for providing a reliable electricity delivery and preventing times with a low standing reserve. We
included the grid operator in our model in the second part of the paper. This significantly decreased
the number of spikes. Moreover, the computed equilibrium electricity prices matched the historically
observed prices very closely.
Numerical simulations were performed by modeling the realistic UK power grid consisting of a
few hundred power plants. A tractable approach to estimate startup costs of power plants from their
historical production was also proposed.
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